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of Public Officials
One of the most intractable problems of the criminal justice system
has been the effect of the freedom of the press on criminal defendants'
right to a fair trial. Until recently, courts and commentators address-
ing the problem have focused on the available procedures for miti-
gating the effects of prejudicial publicity. By now it is well-settled
that various procedural safeguards are required when there is a reason-
able likelihood of prejudice to the defendant.' But it is also recog-
nized that residual prejudice may still linger after the use of any or all
of the established methods-change of venue 2 or venire,3 continuance, 4
1. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723, 726 (1963). Prejudice may be presumed from massive publicity; actual prejudice need
not be shown. In Rideau, the Supreme Court, "without pausing to examine a particu-
larized transcript of the voir dire examination," reversed the defendant's conviction be-
cause of the publicity surrounding his trial. Id. at 727.
2. Change of venue leaves open the obvious possibility that publicity will also be
engendered in the area to which the trial has been transferred. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961). Also, change of venue is useless if the publicity has been nationwide,
or, in a court of limited jurisdiction, if the publicity has been spread through
the entire jurisdiction. Application of Roy M. Cohn, 332 F.2d 976, 977 (2d Cir. 1964);
Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244, 246 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 (1962).
See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). For further discussion of the efficacy of
change of venue in mitigating prejudicial publicity, see Austin, Prejudice and Change
of lenue, 68 DIcK. L. REv. 401 (1964); Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal De-
fendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 11-22 (1971); Note,
The Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349, 360-65 (1960); Note, The Effi-
cacy of a Change of Venue in Protecting a Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 42
NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1967).
3. Change of venire-the summoning of jurors from another locale-shares -the basic
defects of change of venue. It is useless where the publicity has been disseminated
throughout the jurisdiction from which the court can summon a jury. H. FELsHER 9- M.
ROSEN, THE PRESS IN THE JURY Box 200-01 (1966); Note, The Right to an Impartial Jury,
supra note 2, at 365-67.
4. Continuance offers no assurance that the effect of prejudicial publicity will lessen
during the period of the continuance or that publicity will not be revived as the new
trial date draws near. There is also a danger to both the prosecution and defense that
important witnesses and evidence may not be available at a later date. Additionally, a
continuance may conflict with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
H. FELSHER & M. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 201-02; A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME
AND PUBLICIT 96-101 (1967); Stanga, supra note 2, at 11-22; Note, The Right to an
Impartial Jury, supra note 2, at 367-70; Comment, The Impartial Jury-Twentieth Cen-
tury Dilemma: Some Solutions to the Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial, 51
Cornell L.Q. 306, 314-15 (1966).
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voir dire,3 severance,0 waiver of jury trial,7 sequestration,8 and ju-
dicial instructions." Even silence orders directed to the participants"
5. The very act of asking a juror whether he has seen or heard a prejudicial news-
paper report or radio broadcast can call attention to the prejudicial publicity that the
defendant hopes to mitigate. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961); Maryland v. Bal-
timore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 916 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the denial
of a petition for certiorari). Also, if the alleged crime has received extensive publicity, a
voir dire which eliminates those jurors who have been exposed to the publicity may,
as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, leave the defendant with jurors who are
generally uninformed and not capable of satisfactory service on a jury. Iriin v. Dowd,
supra at 722; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878). Furthermore, it is
quite possible that prejudiced jurors would be unwilling to admit their prejudice or would
even be unconscious of it, while well-intentioned but naive jurors would admit their
slightest predisposition and thus be challenged. A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, SUpra note
4, at 103. For a general discussion of voir dire, see Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations:
An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1965).
6. Of course, severance is a theoretical possibility only in multidefendant trials. Among
a group of co-defendants, although severance may be useful to those who have received
relatively less publicity than other co-defendants, severance clearly provides no assistance
to those other defendants who have been the primary focus of the publicity. H. FELSHER
& M. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 202.
7. It has been suggested that judges are less swayed by extraneous issues than jurors.
H. KALVEN & H. ZFISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 495 (1966). There are, however, constraints
on the defendant's ability to waive a jury trial. FEDm. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) provides, "Cases
required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial
in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the government." (Em-
phasis added.) The constitutionality of this rule was upheld in Singer v. United States,
380 U.S. 24 (1965). State practice varies, but in some jurisdictions the defendant's right
to waive a jury trial is subject to limitations. E.g., State v. Fraser, 298 N.E.2d 42. (Ind.
1973); State v. Burnett, 194 Kan. 126, 397 P.2d 346 (1964); State v. Taylor, 391 S.W.2d
835 (Mo. 1965); State v. Scalise, 131 Mont. 238, 309 P.2d 1010 (1957).
On waiver of jury trials generally, see Donnelly, The Defendant's Right to Waive Jury
Trial in Criminal Cases, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 247 (1956); Orfield, Trial by Jury in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 1962 DUKE L.J. 29; Note, Waiving the Right to a Jury Trial in the
Federal Courts: The Burden of Prejudice, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 973 (1973).
8. When effectively applied, sequestration can prevent further publicity from reaching
the jurors after they have been impaneled. It clearly does not remove the effects of prior
publicity. Moreover, the sequestered jurors may feel resentment toward the party who
they know, or believe, requested sequestration. Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial: The
Judge's View, 41 N.D.L. REV. 14, 17-18 (1964); Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAUL
L. REV. 197, 209 n.39 (1963). See generally Comment, Sequestration: A Possible Solution
to the Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma, 23 AI. U.L. REV. 923 (1974).
9. Judicial instructions are widely criticized as being ineffecthe and, at times, harin-
ful because they call the jury's attention to the publicity in question. See, e.g., Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Note, The
Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 222 n.20
(1960).
10. See Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal Trials, 10 HARv. Civ. RiciIis-
Civ. LiB. L. RE'., 608, 618-22 (1975); ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 98-111 (Tent. Draft, 1966);
SPECIAL CONMM. ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE
Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL
38-47 (1967). Placing restrictions on dissemination of news through the police, lawyers,
and the availability of police records raises the likely possibility that the media would
turn to other and less reliable sources. Foreman, A Free Press and a Fair Trial-A
Defense Attorney's View, 11 VILL. L. REV. 704, 707 (1967). More importantly, nothing
would stop the media from publishing the allegedly prejudicial information once it had
been obtained.
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in trials or to the press itself 11-whatever the permissible scope of these
orders under the First Amendment' 2 -- cannot guarantee a trial free
from prejudice. If a reasonable likelihood of prejudice exists after all
the applicable procedural requirements have been met, a fundamental
question arises: does this residual prejudice deny the defendant a
fair trial? This Note contends that it does not, at least in trials of public
officials for crimes related to their office.
The leading Supreme Court cases on prejudicial publicity have con-
cerned trials in which the judge failed to apply particular procedures
for mitigating the effects of publicity. The problem before the Court
has been whether this failure resulted in a substantial possibility of
prejudice, and the solution has been to reverse and remand the case
for a new trial.
11. Silence orders issued to the nedia-enforced by the threat of a contempt citation-
are of doubtful constitutionality. Judicial Conference of the U.S., Comm. on the Opera-
tion of the Jury System, Report on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391,
401-02 (1968) (adopted by the Judicial Conference, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TE UNITED STATES COURTS 1968, at 66-67); ABA, PROJECT
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELA-TING TO FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS 27 (Proposed Final Draft, 1967); SPECIAL COMM., supra note 10, at 11. Cases
decided since the publication of the above reports cast further doubt on the constitu-
tionality of government control or restraint of the media. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.,
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1975) (sanctions on the publication of truthful information
contained in official court records open\ to public inspection held unconstitutional);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974) (candidates' right of
reply statute held unconstitutional); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 418-20 (1971) (injunction forbidding the distribution of informational pamphlets did
not meet the "heavy burden of showing justification" for the imposition of a prior
restraint); Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974) (Powell,
J., Circuit Justice) (granting stay of order restricting media coverage of criminal trial),
dismissed as moot, 420 U.S. 985 (1975). But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85
(1972) ("Newsmen ... may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about
trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an im-
partial tribunal.") (dictum). For a recent discussion of the constitutionality of silence
orders, see Comment, supra note 10.
Even if the constitutional objections-as well as the political objections-could be
overcome, silence orders are still an incomplete solution to the problem of prejudicial
publicity. As has been said of the use of the contempt power in England to prevent
such publicity:
The greatest failure of English contempt law is its disrelation with its most 'aluable
object-protection of fair trials. It is of little service to an accused person who is
written into jail by a prejudiced press that the publisher or editor is fined or
imprisoned.
R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 88 (1963).
12. This Note does not attempt to determine the constitutional limits on the use
of silence orders. Rather it assumes that, at least as long as those limits do not shift
radically, silence orders cannot eliminate the effects of prejudicial publicity. The Note
addresses problems arising after courts have done everything reasonably within their
power to mitigate the effects of publicity. The determination of what is properly
within a court's power is, of course, more difficult in the case of silence orders than
other procedures for mitigating publicity, especially under "balancing" theories of the
First Anendment. See sources cited in note 11 supra.
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The landmark case on prejudicial publicity is Sheppard v. Maxwell.1a
The Court held that Sheppard, who had been convicted of murder
in a state court, was entitled to habeas corpus on the ground that
massive prejudicial publicity had deprived him of his constitutional
right to a fair trial. The court dwelt at length on the errors of the
trial judge and on the remedial measures the judge might have used.
Considering the "deluge of publicity"' 4 that surrounded the trial, the
Court found reversible error in the trial court's failure to use means
to "reduce the appearance of prejudicial material and to protect the
jury from outside influence"'I-the failure, for example, to limit the
presence of the press, to attempt to stop "the release of leads, informa-
tion, and gossip,"'1 to grant a continuance or change of venue, and to
sequester the jury.'7 The Court concluded that "these procedures
would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial ...
The Supreme Court had earlier relied on a similar analysis in
Rideau v. Louisiana'9 to reverse the petitioner's state court conviction.
Rideau had been arrested soon after a man had robbed a bank, kid-
napped three of the bank's employees, and killed one of them. The
next morning, and on the two succeeding days, a filmed "interview"
between Rideau and the local sheriff was shown on television in
which Rideau admitted that he had committed the bank robbery, kid-
napping, and murder. After his arraignment two weeks later, Rideau
filed a motion for change of venue. This was denied and he was con-
victed in the trial court of the parish. The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, holding "that due process of law in this case required
a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not
seen and heard Rideau's televised 'interview.' 2,0 Although based on
13. 384 U.S. 333 (1965).
14. Id. at 357.
15. Id. at 358.
16. Id. at 359.
17. Id. at 363.
18. Id. at 358. On retrial, Sheppard was acquitted. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1966, at
1, col. 7.
19. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
20. Id. at 727. On the ground of denial of a fair trial in violation of the due process
clause, the Supreme Court also reversed a state court conviction in Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965) (in which a hearing preceding the defendant's trial and portions of the
trial itself were televised). On the same ground, the Court vacated and remanded Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (in which the defendant's first motion for change of
venue was granted but a second motion was denied and in which eight of the 12 jurors
admitted on voir dire that they thought the defendant was guilty).
In its most recent decision on prejudicial publicity and the right to a fair trial, how-
ever, the Supreme Court held that the jurors' exposure to publicity concerning the de-
fendant's past crimes, his flamboyant life style, and the alleged crime for which he was
being tried did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, since voir dire indicated no
preconceptions on the jurors' part. Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031 (1975).
126
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the trial court's failure to order a change of venue, the Supreme Court's
holding in Rideau also suggested that if no community could be found
which had not been powerfully influenced to believe the defendant's
guilt, a fair trial could not be held at all. - '
The possibility foreseen by the Court resurfaced, in particularly
dramatic form, in the recent case of Calley v. Calloway.2 2 Calley, a
second lieutenant in the United States Army, had been convicted by
court-martial of premeditated murder and assault with intent to com-
mit murder at My Lai during the Vietnam War. He sought habeas
corpus in the federal courts on the ground, among others, that he
"was denied a fair and impartial trial because of massive adverse pre-
trial publicity."'23 The district court strongly implied that the sensa-
tional publicity accompanying Calley's prosecution had engendered a
level of prejudice which, regardless of the procedural protections used,
would render a conviction invalid. It stated that "[n]ever in the his-
tory of the military justice system, and perhaps in the history of Ameri-
can courts, has any accused ever encountered such intense and con-
tinuous prejudicial publicity as did the Petitioner herein. '24 According
to the court, "this publicity was so inherently prejudicial as to require
reversal,"'2 5 and it stressed the intrinsic weaknesses of change of venue,
21. This suggestion was noted by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Abbott
Laboratories, 505 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975). A drug
company and its officers had been indicted on several counts charging them with mis-
demeanors involving the introduction into interstate commerce of allegedly adulterated
and misbranded drugs. Extensive pretrial publicity had included stories imputing, var-
iously, nine deaths or 50 deaths to the defendants' products. The district court found
that change of venue, continuance, and voir dire would not sufficiently overcome the
'ffects of massive pretrial publicity to ensure a fair trial and, accordingly, dismissed
the indictments. 369 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.C. 1973). Government agencies and depart-
ments were found to be the sources of some of these stories-a factor that weighed
heavily with the district court. Id. at 1403. The Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the
district court's standard as to what was impermissibly prejudicial publicity and re-
sersed the district court's decision. It held that the pretrial publicity had not been so
inflammatory that a fair trial was absolutely precluded, and that it was improper to
dismiss the indictment without at least an attempt to see if an impartial jury could
be provided. The court acknowledged, however, that Rideau v. Louisiana does "suggest
that pretrial publicity may be so prejudicial that no trial by jury drawn from the
community in which it was disseminated would be constitutionally fair, and thus that
the prosecution should be quashed if a change of venue to an unpolluted community
is not possible." 505 F.2d at 571. The court did not deny that Abbott might be such a
case; it merely held that such a determination should not be made before the lower court
had even attempted to impanel a jury. Id. at 571.
22. 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd, 17 CGamt. L. REP. 2500 (5th Cir., Sept. 9
1975).
23. 382 F. Supp. at 656.
24. Id. at 657.
25. Id. Later in its opinion the court noted, "The record in this case shows 'that
the Petitioner's trial was affected by isolatable demonstrated prejudice and by inherent
.prejudice to such an extent that the petitioner was denied due process. Judged by
every standard established by the decided cases, his conviction should be set aside.
12
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continuance, and voir dire.2 6
On appeal the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district
court chiefly because, in its view, the intense publicity had not been
prejudicial to Calley.27 In addition, the Fifth Circuit suggested that
it was satisfied with the procedures used by the trial court in the cir-
cumstances, emphasizing that the court-martial had been preceded by
a careful voir dire,28 and that "the military court did the best it could
to control publicity."
29
The difference between the district court and the Fifth Circuit con-
cerning the actual harm to Calley from the publicity surrounding his
case conceals a fundamental problem that courts may no longer be
able to avoid. It is now possible that the elaboration of procedural
safeguards designed to offset the effects of prejudicial publicity has
matured to a point where for the first time the problem of publicity
faces the courts in its most elemental form: assuming that all prac-
ticable safeguards have been used, what amount, if any, of possible
residual prejudice in the jtirors' minds justifies setting aside a con-
viction?
Recent and impending prosecutions attended by publicity as mas-
sive and protracted as any in history may force a resolution of
this question by the Supreme Court. The prosecutions of the Water-
gate defendants30 followed two years of charges, headlines, nationally
televised hearings, impeachment proceedings, and finally the resigna-
tion and subsequent pardon of a close associate of the defendants, the
President of the United States. It may have been literally impossible
to empanel a jury anywhere in the nation that did not have some
preconception of the guilt or innocence of the defendants. Similarly
the conduct and motives of Patricia Hearst, who may be tried in the
Stated otherwise, if there has ever been a case in which a conviction should be set aside
because of prejudicial publicity, this is it." Id. at 691 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 687. A similar approach has been adopted in other highly publicized cases.
In the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Judge Gordon dismissed federal indictments against
10 defendants accused of destroying Selective Service records. He observed that, of the
142 prospective jurors, only one had not heard of the case. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1969,
at 9, col. 1. In the murder trial of Black Panther leader Bobby Scale and others, the jury
was unable to reach a verdict and Judge Mulvey then granted a defense motion to
dismiss all the charges against the defendants. Despite the considerable efforts that had
been made to ensure a fair trial, Judge Mulvey stated, "I find it impossible to believe
that an unbiased jury could be selected without superhuman effort-efforts which this
court, the state and these defendants should not be called upon either to make or to
endure." N.Y. Times, May 26, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
27. 17 CRIM. L. REP. 2500 (5th Cir., Sept. 9, 1975).
28. Id. at 2501.
29. Id.
30. Ehrlichman v. Sirica, 419 U.S. 1310 (1974) (Burger, C.J., Circuit Justice); United
States v. Mitchell, Crim. No. 74-110 (D.D.C., Jan. 1, 1975), notice of appeal filed, No.
75-1381 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 28, 1975).
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foreseeable future, were a matter of daily speculation throughout the
country for more than a year.
The problem posed by these prosecutions was adumbrated in the
Calley case. The district court, anticipating that its decision might be
read as removing an entire class of defendants from the reach of
criminal justice, asserted that "[t]his opinion of the Court should not
be construed as holding that if an individual who is charged with
offenses achieves sufficient notoriety as a result of his alleged acts the
charges should be dismissed." 3 1 Notwithstanding this disclaimer, it is
hard not to construe the district court's opinion as meaning that a
defendant so adversely affected by publicity as Galley could never be
convicted.
A theory of fairness which requires more than the timely applica-
tion of established procedural protections-and asks that convictions
not be upheld where possible residual publicity exceeds a specific level
-will have the effect of preventing altogether the trial of certain de-
fendants for certain notorious crimes.32 This result, while not appeal-
ing in any case, is particularly unsettling when applied to high public
officials, on whom the successful operation of our political institutions
largely depends. Nevertheless, if this standard of fairness were consti-
tutionally required in trials of public officials, the courts would of
course have to adopt it. The Constitution does not, however, go that far.
The Constitution guarantees due process of law to criminal de-
fendants in all courts, and spells out a specific requirement of an "im-
partial jury" in federal prosecutions. 33 Due process is a function both
31. 382 F. Supp. at 691.
32. A recent Comment adopts such a theory and reluctantly accepts its consequences.
Comment, supra note 10. Citing Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 726 (1963), the Comment
states that "a conviction cannot stand if it results from the state's failure to provide a
trial free from prejudice," Comment, supra at 611, and proposes as the constitutional
standard that "jurors not be exposed to influences which would interfere with the open-
minded and fair determination of guilt or innocence." Id. at 616. Applying this standard,
it admits the likelihood that, given the First Amendment test it proposes for the issuance
of gag orders, "some convictions [in the Watergate cases] will be reversed as a result [of
prejudicial publicity]." Id. at 635.
33. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
The "impartial jury" provision in the Sixth Amendment has not yet been held ap-
plicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, although other provisions of
the Sixth Amendment have been. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968).
In reviewing state court convictions allegedly tainted by publicity, the Supreme Court
has based its decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause which, the
Court has held, entitles the defendant to a fair trial. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
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of history and of fundamental fairness. History has no immediate voice
in the problem at hand because only recently has massive and pro-
tracted nationwide publicity become a common incident of criminal
trials. The problem of media-induced bias which cannot be purged
from jurors' minds has yet to be addressed squarely by the courts. As
to fairness, the essential determination must rely on the circumstances
of specific cases or classes of cases.
The Sixth Amendment requirement of an "impartial jury" is neces-
sarily informed by the idea of fundamental fairness. While this idea
immediately excludes jurors who have a stake in the outcome or are
personal foes of the accused, a standard of absolute impartiality is,
equally clearly, beyond reach. In Justice Minton's famous dictum, "[a]
defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."
34
The essential circumstance governing the question of fairness in
trials of public officials is that in our society such defendants are
people who have chosen to put themselves and their conduct before
the public. Exposure to extensive publicity has for years been an ac-
knowledged fact of public life. It is a prerequisite of campaigning
for office and a concomitant of holding it. Publicity cannot but follow
upon allegations of misdeeds by public officials. Indeed, the press is
widely believed to have an obligation to subject the conduct of public
officials to close scrutiny. Even if society's decision to allow such a role
to the press were ultimately misguided, it would still bear decisively
on the question of fairness in trials of public officials. Unlike most
other citizens, public officials can legitimately be said to have assumed
the risk of publicity surrounding allegations of misconduct. In the cir-
cumstances, it can hardly be considered unfair to make them account-
able for their actions in criminal trials (assuming appropriate procedur-
al safeguards), even if the effects of publicity cannot be purged from
the jurors' minds.
U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). It is somewhat unclear whether-as regards
prejudicial publicity-any difference exists between the impartial jury requirement and
the due process requirement. The Court has tended to equate the two. In Irvin v.
Dowd, for instance, the Court noted, "In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to
the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The
failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due
process." Id. at 722. It is clear, however, that the Court is more willing to reverse con-
victions-because of the effects of prejudicial publicity-under its "supervisory power to
formulate and apply proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law in the
federal courts," Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959) (per curialn), than
"as a matter of constitutional compulsion." Murphy v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2035 (1975).
34. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953). The Lutwak dictum has often
been cited by courts in denying appeals on grounds of prejudicial publicity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 709-10 (7th Cir. 1966); People v. Robertsdn, 74
Ill. App. 2d 360, 363, 220 N.E.2d. 5, 7 (1966).
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There are analogous ideas of fairness expressed in other areas of con-
stitutional law. The Supreme Court has recognized that certain com-
mon law rights of those who become public officials can properly
be made to depend on their ability to have anticipated intense ex-
posure to public scrutiny. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 5 the
first in a line of decisions attempting to harmonize the law of defama-
tion with the demands of the First Amendment, the Court concluded
that a public official could not recover from a newspaper for false
statements of fact made without actual malice. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc, 36 the most recent of the sequels to New York Times, the
Court refused to extend the New York Times principle to statements
about private individuals. Distinguishing public officials and public
figures from private individuals, the Court in Gertz advanced the view
that it is fair to treat public officials as having accepted the "necessary
consequences" of "closer public scrutiny":
37
An individual who decides to seek governmental office must ac-
cept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public
affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might other-
wise be the case. And society's interest in the officers of govern-
ment is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of official
duties. . . . The public's interest extends to "anything which
might touch on an official's fitness for office . .. ."
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every in-
stance, the communications media are entitled to act on the
assumption that public officials and public figures have volun-
tarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defama-
tory falsehood concerning them.
The analogy of New York Times and Gertz with the problem of
fair trials is admittedly not perfect. In the New York Times line of
cases, various common law and statutory rights to recover in defama-
tion were made to yield to freedoms guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. The problem here is to determine the boundaries of the con-
stitutional rights of public officials accused of crimes.
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
37. Id. at 344-45 (citation omitted). The possibility of applying the Gertz rationale
in this context was suggested but rejected in Comment, supra note 10, at 635 n.141. The
Comment observes that one way for courts to avoid reversals of the convictions of high
political officials because of prejudicial publicity "would be to set a different prej-
udice standard." Id. This Note does not contend that the standard of fairness for private
citizens should necessarily be different from that for public officials. It does contend,
however, that a standard of fairness which requires only that all procedural protections
be reasonably applied is most justified when the defendant is a public official.
The Yale Law Journal
There are instances, however, in which the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the extent of one's constitutional rights can turn on one's
status as a public official. The Court has consistently upheld § 9 of
the Hatch Act,3 8 which prohibits political activity by public employees,
against First and Fifth Amendment challenges. The Court's most re-
cent pronouncement to this effect is in United States Civil Service
Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,9 where the
Court stated, "Our judgment is that neither the First Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this
kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees. '4° The Court
concluded in Letter Carriers that the scope of public employees' rights
of expression and political association could be determined in part by
society's interest in "fair and effective government":
41
Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the
country appears to have been that partisan political activities by
federal employees must be limited if the Government is to op-
erate effectively and fairly . ..
.. . [T]he government has an interest in regulating the con-
duct and "the speech of its employees that differ[s] significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech
of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive
at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees."
Society's interest in responsible government similarly supports the
solution offered here to the problem of publicity in trials of public
officials. 42 Misconduct by public officials, which tends to affect the
state itself, threatens the power of the people to govern through their
representatives, and ultimately places the rule of law in jeopardy. The
need to hold public officials accountable is correspondingly great. If
the public interest can justifiably shape government employees' rights
38. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (Supp. III 1973). See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947); United States Ciil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
39. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
40. Id. at 556.
41. Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
42. Of course, it could be argued that the investigative resources of Congress and
the media provide more appropriate means of protecting the public interest in pre-
venting officials' misconduct than do criminal trials. Neither Congress nor the media,
however, are required to provide judicial safeguards in such investigations, nor are they
really capable of assuming the role of the courts in establishing guilt. Further, the pub-
licity generated by congressional or journalistic investigations can compound the threat to
an impartial trial. See, e.g., Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 111 (Ist Cir. 1952).
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of speech and association, it would seem no less to justify subjecting
public officials to some of the inevitable consequences of public
scrutiny.
43
There remains the difficult question of who should be considered
a public official. Some state laws provide definitions of public offi-
cials for administrative purposes, but the Supreme Court has refused
to accept these definitions as relevant for purposes of the New York
Times principle, which involves a "national constitutional protec-
tion."4 4 The Court's efforts to delineate those included within the
New York Times principle provide a useful analogy in defining a
public official for purposes of the fairness standard proposed here.
Although the Court in New York Times announced a case-by-case
approach for deciding who is a public official,45 in Rosenblatt v. Baer
43. Other examples of limitations imposed on public officials and employees are also
revealing. Although perhaps not as dramatic as the New York Times principle or the
Hatch Act, these limitations concern important interests. For instance, various state and
local laws curtail (at least in theory) public employees' right to strike. See Witt, The
Public Sector Strike: Dilemma of the Seventies, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 102 (1971). In recent
years, federal as well as state legislation has been enacted to compel financial dis-
closure by candidates for and holders of particular offices. See, e.g., Note, The Con-
stitutionality of Financial Disclosure Laws, 59 CORNELL L. Rtv. 345 (1974); Note, Public
Officials: The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Public Financial Disclosure
Statutes, and a Proposal for Change, 1971 LAw & Soc. ORD. 104; Note, Mandatory Fi-
nancial Disclosure Statements From Public Officials-Unwarranted Intrusion or Legiti-
mate Public Concern?, 45 TUL. L. REV. 167 (1970). The common law has for centuries
forbidden public officials from holding what it considered to be incompatible offices.
Knuckles v. Board of Educ., 272 Ky. 431, 114 SAW.2d 511 (1938); Howard v. Harrington,
114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769 (1916); Weza v. Auditor Gen., 297 Mich. 686, 298 N.W. 368
(1941); Note, The Common Law Rule Against Holding Incompatible Offices-Abolishing
the "Office" Limitation, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 667 (1974). Also, prior to and some-
times during employment, some government employees must take loyalty oaths or undergo
security investigations. Developments in the Law-The National Security Interests and
Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1130, 1160-89 (1972).
Of course, not every instance of the law's special treatment of public officials is to their
detriment. The law confers on some public officials, in some circumstances, legal protec-
tions not accorded other citizens. There is, for example, the well-established principle
of state and federal common law that public officials and public employees are not
liable for unintentional fault in the exercise of discretionary functions. 3 K. DAVIS, AD-
MINIS- ATIVE L,%W TRTISE § 26.01, at 506 (1958). Similarly, the Supreme Court has held
that an absolute privilege protects the utterances of federal officials if made "within
the outer perimeter" of their duties. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).
Thus, public officials can be subject both to particular legal disabilities and par-
ticular legal protections; the law has been willing, in a number of different situations,
to recognize that there are special considerations governing the legal status of public
officials, and to shape legal doctrines accordingly. The standard proposed in this Note
can be seen as such a doctrine, fully warranted by the special status of public officials
when they are defendants in criminal prosecutions.
44. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966) (footnote omitted).
45. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964). The Court has
also adopted this case-by-case approach in deciding to whom besides public officials
the New York Times principle should apply. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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it set forth a core definition: 46
It is clear, therefore, that the "public official" designation applies
at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government em-
ployees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental
affairs.
Courts have given this definition a broad interpretation. Rosenblatt
was remanded for a determination whether a county recreation super-
visor met the standard, which has subsequently been applied to ap-
pointive as well as elective positions.
47
The Rosenblatt definition is a workable and logically defensible one
for purposes of this Note. The idea of a knowing assumption of the
burdens as well as benefits of public office is fairer and more realistic
in the case of officials in the higher ranks of the government. Em-
ployees among the generally unheralded ranks of postal workers, for
example, would, upon accepting employment, give scant thought to
the possibility of publicity resulting from their status. A high official
of local, state, or national government may, and definitely should,
give considerable thought to the possible consequences of public
scrutiny. It is also likely that public officials within the core defini-
tion have the greatest power to injure the public interest, a power
which argues strongly for their accountability to the public.
The core definition of public official should, however, be applied
more narrowly in trials surrounded by prejudicial publicity than in
defamation actions. The latter involve the determination of the con-
stitutional right of a defendant under the First Amendment; the
former, of a criminal defendant under the Sixth Amendment. In either
case close questions about the category of public official should be
resolved in favor of those constitutional rights. Hence the status of
"public official," which is broadly construed for plaintiffs in defama-
tion, should be narrowly construed for criminal defendants.
There is the further question whether the proposed fairness stan-
dard should extend beyond trials for offenses related to office. Fair-
ness does not clearly compel a distinction between officials' public and
private conduct; one who assumes the burden of public scrutiny can
hardly expect that scrutiny to stop at the statehouse. But the public
interest in preserving the integrity of government does allow a dis-
46. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (footnote omitted).
47. 383 U.S. at 87-88. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1969) (Chicago
deputy chief of police held a public official); Local 1581, AFT v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974) (officers of teachers' union).
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tinction. The rule of law is less immediately threatened by the private
misconduct of public officials than by their breaches of duty. At the
very least, then, the solution to the problem of publicity advanced
here for trials of public officials-while conceivably applicable to all
misconduct-is more strongly supported by public policy when ap-
plied to misconduct in office.
More broadly, the Constitution may require only that courts do all
they reasonably can to mitigate the effects of prejudicial publicity in
any trial. To reverse convictions because of prejudice which remains
after the application of the available procedural safeguards would
effectively immunize some defendants in highly sensational cases. It is
open to question whether the guarantee of a fair trial compels this
result for any defendant-public official or private citizen.
